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Illinois Courts Struggle with Implicit Bias and Justice
Stevens’s Legacy: Why Illinois Should Revisit His
Dissenting Opinion in Purkett v. Elem
Ted A. Donner*
Contemporary racial justice movements and increased interest in implicit bias are shining a spotlight on the role of peremptory challenges in
jury selection and how best to combat prejudice in this essential step of
the criminal justice system. States such as Arizona and Washington have
undertaken reforms designed to shift a dynamic that, under Batson, has
prioritized obvious and intentional discrimination and ignored the more
subtle but perhaps equally insidious effects of implicit bias. Focusing first
on the history of peremptory challenges in Illinois, this article next looks
to how the current state of the law can be reconciled with the law on
challenges for cause and what areas of inquiry may be pursued in voir
dire. The author concludes that Illinois should consider taking steps
along a path specifically avoided by the United States Supreme Court in
Purkett v. Elem—one that Justice John Paul Stevens embraced in his dissent in that case. Such an approach would require less of a focus on the
intent of the attorneys and more on jurors’ ability to perform their duties
under law.
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INTRODUCTION
There were not a lot of jury trials in Illinois during the pandemic; however, as life started to pick up again, so, too, did court proceedings—and
with them, the number of arguments over who may have been denied a
fair trial because of how the jury was selected. The country was still reeling from the circumstances surrounding the death of George Floyd in
Minnesota,1 and the Black Lives Matter movement was getting some long
overdue attention. Problems in jury trials throughout the country were
thus more pervasive for many reasons, but disproportionately evident in
cases involving whether jurors had been wrongly excused because of
their race.2
In People v. Little,3 the First District Appellate Court in Illinois found
that a claim for ineffective assistance should go forward because counsel
had failed to pursue a Batson hearing after the State excused the only
African American juror, despite evidence that the questioned juror
“share[d] common characteristics with [other] selected jurors, except for
race.”4 The Second District found that “procedural irregularities” in a
Batson hearing held in State v. Trejo5 warranted a remand.6 And, in
1. See, e.g., People v. Ammons, 2021 IL App (3d) 150743, ¶ 63 (“There is currently a widespread distrust of, and often antipathy toward, the police by many in the community, particularly
in the wake of the killing of George Floyd.”).
2. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that a peremptory challenge cannot
be used to exclude jurors solely based on their race). The prohibition on excusing jurors under the
Equal Protection Clause applies when the process tends to exclude members of other protected
classes as well. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (“While the
prejudicial attitudes toward women in this country have not been identical to those held toward
racial minorities, the similarities between the experiences of racial minorities and women, in some
contexts, ‘overpower those differences.’” (citing Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based
Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1920, 1921 (1992)). But problems with racism have
garnered particular attention in the last few years, giving rise to some dramatic changes in how voir
dire is conducted in some states, and this article focuses on those changes in the law.
3. People v. Little, 2021 IL App (1st) 191108, ¶ 41.
4. Id. ¶ 29; see also People v. Williams, 807 N.E.2d 448, 459 (Ill. 2004) (“Batson established a
three-step procedure to determine whether the State’s use of peremptory challenges resulted in the
removal of venirepersons on the basis of race. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing
that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, once such a
showing has been made, the burden shifts to the State to provide a race-neutral explanation for
excluding each of the venirepersons in question. Defense counsel may rebut the proffered explanations as pretextual. Finally, the trial court determines whether the defendant has met his burden of
demonstrating purposeful discrimination.” (internal citations omitted)).
5. People v. Trejo, 2021 IL App (2d) 190424, ¶ 17.
6. Id. ¶¶ 17–19.
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People v. Bradshaw,7 the Third Circuit held that a murder case should be
remanded for a new trial because the State’s reliance on a prospective
juror’s “criminal contacts” did not qualify as a race-neutral reason for
striking that juror.8
In all of these cases, the courts used particularly strong terms to emphasize the importance of the problem, but the prosecution of these defendants, despite evidence that their convictions stemmed at least in part
from racism, nevertheless continued. In Bradshaw, the court reiterated
that “racial discrimination in jury selection offends the Equal Protection
Clause” but found that the defendant could be subjected to a second trial
because “the evidence was sufficient to convict [but for] a defective jury
selection process.”9 In Trejo, the court acknowledged that the prosecution
“is forbidden from using peremptory challenges to exclude potential jury
members based on race or gender,” but then retained jurisdiction so that
a more procedurally correct hearing could be conducted, perhaps without
the need for a new trial.10 And in Little, the case was remanded for further
proceedings, despite finding that “racial discrimination in jury selection
is universally recognized as a constitutional error of the highest magnitude,”11 because the only question before the court was whether certain
claims of ineffective assistance should have been dismissed.12
As in too many other cases decided in the almost four decades since
Batson, these three Illinois cases highlighted the need to answer a number
of particularly important questions about racism in Illinois jury trials. Is
there a better way to approach the use of peremptory challenges in this
state? Can Illinois address how bigotry and prejudice still infect our judicial process while protecting the parties’ interests in having some say
over who decides their case? And can we somehow protect against the
possibility that those participating in a given trial, including the litigants,
the judge, and the jurors themselves, may eventually fall victim to their

7. People v. Bradshaw, 2020 IL App (3d) 180027, ¶¶ 40–41.
8. Id.
9. Id. ¶¶ 35, 43.
10. Trejo, 2021 IL App (2d) 190424, ¶¶ 7, 17–19. On remand, the trial court judge held the
hearing required by the appellate court and found there had been no discrimination. See Clifford
Ward, Judge Rules No Racial Bias in Selection of Jury That Convicted Baseball Bat Killer of Two,
CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 25, 2021), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/lake-county-news-sun/ct-lnstrejo-hearing-st-1026-20211025-gy7x7lk4z5gxppwou2ztdmnx24-story.html
[https://perma.cc/CE78-YPKL] (reporting Trejo case’s outcome).
11. People v. Little, 2021 IL App (1st) 191108, ¶ 40.
12. Id. ¶ 41; see also Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen a
violation of equal protection in jury selection has been proven, the remedy is a new trial, without
the need for any inquiry into harmless error or examination of the empaneled jury. . . . In fact, since
a time well before Batson was decided, the Court has followed an automatic reversal rule once a
violation of equal protection in the selection of jurors has been proven.”).
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own implicit biases?13
Recognizing that good intentions often make for bad asphalt, this article seeks to address these questions from three different perspectives. Focusing first on the history of challenges in Illinois to anticipate which next
steps might make the most sense in the context of that evolution, this article then looks to how the current law on peremptory challenges can be
reconciled with the law on challenges for cause and what areas of inquiry
may be pursued in voir dire.14 This article concludes that the linchpin to
reconciling these laws and principles—how voir dire is intended to determine whether prospective jurors can do what would be expected of them
as members of the jury—should likewise play a more important part in
determining whether peremptory challenges are being abused in a given
case.
I. JUSTICE STEVENS’S DISSENT IN PURKETT AND ITS RELEVANCE TODAY
The Washington Supreme Court has introduced a new rule that specifically requires judges to consider implicit bias the same way they do intentional discrimination under Batson.15 Arizona has found, in the
13. See Michael I. Norton et al., Bias in Jury Selection: Justifying Prohibited Peremptory Challenges, 20 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 467, 476 (2007) (“Do attorneys, aware of the proscription
against the use of race and gender . . . continue to use race and gender in an effort to select juries
favorable to their clients? The limited available evidence suggests that they do. Rose observed jury
selection proceedings for 13 criminal trials, 12 of which had a Black defendant. Based on the logic
underlying our experiments, we would expect prosecutors to challenge Black jurors—presumed to
be sympathetic to a Black defendant—while defense attorneys would want to retain such jurors,
making them more likely to challenge White jurors. This is exactly what Rose observed: 71% of
observed Black juror challenges were made by the prosecution and 81% of White juror challenges
were made by the defense.” (internal citations omitted)).
14. See Hall v. Cipolla, 2018 IL App (4th) 170664, ¶ 170 (“As the name suggests, a challenge
for cause asserts a reason why the prospective juror is unqualified to serve, such as bias or prejudice.
A peremptory challenge, by contrast, need not be supported by a reason.”).
15. See WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 37:
(a) Policy and Purpose. The purpose of this rule is to eliminate the unfair exclusion of
potential jurors based on race or ethnicity.
...
(d) Response. Upon objection to the exercise of a peremptory challenge pursuant to
this rule, the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall articulate the reasons
that the peremptory challenge has been exercised.
(e) Determination. The court shall then evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of circumstances. If the court determines
that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the
peremptory challenge, then the peremptory challenge shall be denied. The court
need not find purposeful discrimination to deny the peremptory challenge.
Id. The rule in Batson otherwise requires a finding that any wrongful use of peremptory challenges
be intentional before the court can fashion a remedy.
“[The] State’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges[] is
subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause [which] forbids [counsel] to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race. . . .” This principle also applies

2022]

Illinois Courts Struggle with Implicit Bias

721

meantime, that the best way to avoid the problems inherent in the use of
peremptory challenges may well be to eliminate the practice altogether.16
While a number of states are in turn looking at reforms based, more or
less, on either the Washington or Arizona solutions,17 this article concludes that Illinois should pursue a different path altogether. Instead of
maintaining the three-step analysis in Batson and its progeny, Illinois
should consider taking a few additional steps along a path specifically
avoided by the United States Supreme Court in Purkett v. Elem,18 one that
Justice John Paul Stevens embraced in his dissent and that the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit first concluded was necessary in that
case.
Maybe, as Justice Stevens and the Eighth Circuit both reasoned, it
makes sense to be skeptical of supposedly race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges when they don’t actually relate to whether a prospective juror can do what is required of them under the law. Maybe the
Eighth Circuit was right when it concluded that
[i]n a case such as this, where the prosecution strikes a prospective juror
who is a member of the defendant’s racial group, solely on the basis of
factors which are facially irrelevant to the question of whether that person is qualified to serve as a juror in the particular case, the prosecution
must at least articulate some plausible race-neutral reason for believing
those factors will somehow affect the person’s ability to perform his or
her duties as a juror. In the present case, the prosecutor’s comments, “I
to gender discrimination in peremptory challenges. . . . While the striking of even a
single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose violates a defendant’s constitutional rights, the mere fact that the State peremptorily challenged a venireman of the
same race as the defendant, or the mere number of veniremen of the defendant’s race
peremptorily challenged, will not by itself make a prima facie case. . . . [Thus, the] court
determines whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination in light of [any
proffered] explanation [for the challenge] and any rebuttal [by the movant].
People v. Bridges, 158 N.E.3d 1198, 1205–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)).
16. See Arizona Supreme Court, No. R-21-0020, Order Amending Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 47(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Aug. 30, 2021) (eliminating peremptory challenges in Arizona); see also Hassan Kanu, Arizona Breaks New Ground in
Nixing Peremptory Challenges, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2021, 1:52 PM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/arizona-breaks-new-ground-nixing-peremptory-challenges-2021-09-01/
[https://perma.cc/A4EB-X8B7] (“Arizona’s top court shocked even some advocates last week
when it unexpectedly, even quietly, became the first state to eliminate outright the century-old
practice of peremptory juror challenges, which have historically been plagued with race discrimination. Beginning Jan. 1, [2022] only for-cause challenges will be allowed in Arizona under a landmark rule change ordered by the state Supreme Court on Monday.”).
17. See Batson Reform: State by State, BERKELEY L. DEATH PENALTY CLINIC,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/experiential/clinics/death-penalty-clinic/projects-and-cases/whitewashing-the-jury-box-how-california-perpetuates-the-discriminatory-exclusion-of-black-andlatinx-jurors/batson-reform-state-by-state/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2022) [https://perma.cc/3NX2FM7M] (tracking state changes in peremptory challenge practices).
18. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
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don’t like the way he looks, with the way the hair is cut. . . . And the
mustache and the beard look suspicious to me,” do not constitute such
legitimate race-neutral reasons for striking [a prospective] juror. 19

There is likely some truth to the idea that history will never care
whether counsel’s motivations were consciously or unconsciously racist
in a given case, so long as the result was to perpetuate institutional racism.20 But Washington’s General Rule 37 still isn’t likely to solve the
problem because it relies as much on judges getting past their implicit
biases as the existing law does of counsel.
Likewise, no matter how many well-meaning jurists, attorneys, and
scholars may call for peremptory challenges to be done away with altogether,21 surrendering what little control a criminal defendant may still
have over the process remains a fundamentally undemocratic way to proceed in any case. It is a choice akin to abolishing the popular vote in presidential elections,22 and it does little more than substitute one potentially
biased decision-maker (counsel) with another (the judge).
A more balanced approach, which allows for peremptory challenges to
remain available but would require more scrutiny into whether they are
used as they should be warrants consideration. In the end, what Justice
19. Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1994), rev’d per curiam, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
20. See, e.g., Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010) (“[P]resent methods of addressing bias
in the legal system—particularly in jury selection—which are directed primarily at explicit bias,
may only worsen implicit bias. Specifically, judge-dominated voir dire and the Batson challenge
process are well-intentioned methods of attempting to eradicate bias from the judicial process, but
they actually perpetuate legal fictions that allow implicit bias to flourish.”).
21. See Richard Gabriel, Thank and Excuse: Five Steps Toward Improving Jury Selection, JURY
EXPERT, Aug. 2015, at 6, 6 (“The main arguments given for removing the peremptory challenge
are that the challenges can be used to discriminate against a particular protected class (e.g., minorities, women) or that they can unfairly stack a jury in favor of one side over the other. The elimination of peremptory challenges would, in fact, harm the rights of the parties to obtain a fair and
impartial jury and is a wrong-headed solution to a very real problem that does exist in today’s jury
selections across the country.”); see also Courtney A. Waggoner, Comment, Peremptory Challenges and Religion: The Unanswered Prayer for a Supreme Court Opinion, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
285, 325–26 (2004) (“The peremptory challenge has been argued to not effectively remove bias
from the jury. In fact some studies have shown that prosecutors peremptorily strike as many jurors
that fit the perception of unwilling to convict as those actually willing to find the defendant guilty.
Ultimately, some argue that these inconsistencies render the peremptory challenge not as beneficial
to the judicial system as first thought.”).
22. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 206, 215–16 (1995) (“[T]he link between jury service and other rights of political participation such as voting is an important part of our overall constitutional structure, spanning
three centuries and eight amendments: the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth. . . . [The] slippery slope problems [we find in defining which
cognizable groups warrant protection in jury selection] have plagued courts because the doctrine at
present is not informed by a workable theory to identify protected groups. . . . But the . . . slippery
slopes disappear when we recognize jury service is analogous to other important rights of political
participation, especially voting.”).
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Stevens said in his dissent in Purkett all those years ago, given how prescient his concern turned out to be, at least warrants his home state’s contemplating a different path than that mapped out by either Washington or
Arizona. Adopting procedures to ensure that each peremptory challenge
has at least some relationship to whether the prospective jurors are able
to do what the law requires of them, whether at the trial or the appellate
level, would at least put an end to the inherently problematic dialogue
over whether an attorney’s “silly or superstitious” reasons for excusing a
particular juror should be upheld.23
It would encourage counsel to think about the more constructive question of why they do or do not want a given candidate on the jury rather
than about how they will defend themselves if they choose to excuse a
woman or a person of color from the venire. And it would help to reconcile other internal conflicts in the law of jury selection generally, establishing more of a relationship between what questions are allowed and
what counsel should be allowed to do with the information each question
generates.
As the Eighth Circuit concluded in Purkett (before the Supreme Court
reversed that decision and first confirmed that “silly or superstitious” reasons could be sufficient), counsel ought to be able to demonstrate that
their reasons for striking a prospective juror have at least something to do
with “whether that person is qualified to serve as a juror in the particular
case.”24 So Justice John Paul Stevens, the Chicago native who dissented
from the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Purkett,25 may well have
23. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam); id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1994), rev’d per curiam, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
The Eighth Circuit continued:
Batson leaves room for the State to exercise its peremptory challenges on the basis of
the prosecuor’s legitimate ‘hunches’ and past experience, so long as racial discrimination is not the motive. . . . [But] we do not believe . . . that Batson is satisfied by “neutral
explanations” which are no more than facially legitimate, reasonably specific and clear.
Were facially neutral explanations sufficient without more, Batson would be meaningless. It would take little effort for prosecutors who are of such a mind to adopt rote
“neutral explanations” which bear facial legitimacy but conceal a discriminatory motive.
Id. at 682–83 (quoting State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 65 (Mo. 1987)).
25. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was notably joined in his
dissent by only one other member of the Court, Justice Stephen Breyer. Id. Ironically, Justice
Breyer announced his retirement just as this article was completed. See Mark Sherman & Michael
Balsamo, Justice Breyer to Retire from Supreme Court, Giving President Biden Opening to Fill
Vacancy, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 26, 2022), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-aud-nwbreyer-supreme-court-retires-20220126-p3wmda4hm5b4ramg3kd4xoslg4-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9WPH-2BF4] (describing potential implications of Justice Breyer’s retirement).
Justice Breyer’s successor, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, was confirmed by the Senate in April
2022, making her the first African American woman to serve on the high court. Ketanji Brown
Jackson to Serve on the U.S. Supreme Court, https://www.whitehouse.gov/kbj/ [https://
perma.cc/D92X-YMHE].
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gotten it right when he embraced the Eighth Circuit’s view on the subject.
Indeed, Illinois could do worse than to follow his lead and require that
counsel here at least do what he said should have been required in Purkett.
As he wrote in his dissent,
In my opinion, preoccupation with the niceties of a three-step analysis
should not foreclose meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial explanations that are entirely unrelated to the case to be tried. I would adhere
to the Batson rule that such an explanation does not satisfy step two.
Alternatively, I would hold that, in the absence of an explicit trial court
finding on the issue, a reviewing court may hold that such an explanation is pretextual as a matter of law. The Court’s unnecessary tolerance
of silly, fantastic, and implausible explanations, together with its assumption that there is a difference of constitutional magnitude between
a statement that “I had a hunch about this juror based on his appearance,” and “I challenged this juror because he had a mustache,” demeans the importance of the values vindicated by our decision in Batson.26

II. HISTORY OF CHALLENGES TO PROSPECTIVE JURORS IN ILLINOIS
Before turning to the ways in which Justice Stevens’s perspective differed from that of the majority in Purkett, and why that still matters today,
it is important to consider the role that peremptory challenges play in the
jury selection process. It has always been the stated goal of the Illinois
courts, in this regard, to ensure that the jury selected through voir dire is
prepared to fairly weigh the evidence, follow the law, and decide the case
as a group in a fair and even-handed manner. But the process through
which the parties and the public have gotten any assurance that is what
actually happens is somewhat fragile in its construction, based as it is on
an evolving understanding of what people think, how they make decisions, and what needs to be done to ensure that what they do comports
with the applicable law and their obligations as jurors.
The struggle over how that process should be managed is as old as the
state itself. Indeed, the first case to consider what challenges for cause
should be allowed for prospective jurors was decided just four years to
the day after Illinois was first admitted as a state to the Union.27 On December 1, 1822, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether “[a] juror
[who had] formed an opinion but had not expressed it” should have been

26. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 777–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. See Coughlin v. People, 33 N.E. 1, 9 (Ill. 1893) (“The first case in which the competency of
a juror who had formed an opinion was considered [was] Noble v. People, Breese 54 [decided on
December 1, 1822].”); see also James A. Edstrom, “With . . . Candour and Good Faith”: Nathaniel
Pope and the Admission Enabling Act of 1818, 88 ILL. HIST. J. 241, 243 (1995) (noting that Illinois
was admitted to the Union on December 3, 1818).
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permitted to serve.28 In Noble v. People, the court found it clear that “all
men shall be tried by an impartial jury” but went on to find that, because
human beings are proud by nature, whether one should be permitted to sit
as a juror could rightly turn, not on whether someone had any particular
bias or view on the issues to be tried, but instead on whether he had ever
publicly expressed about those views.29 “[A]s the mind of man is so organized,” the court thus held, “it is almost impossible for a jury to be
perfectly impartial.”30 So in Smith v. Eames, the court found that “[t]he
human mind is so constituted that it is almost impossible, on hearing a
report freely circulated in a county or neighborhood, to prevent it from
coming to some conclusion on the subject . . . .”31 In Gray v. People, the
court found that a juror should not have been allowed to sit who testified
that he would believe the defendants guilty if it turned out they were the
same men referenced in certain newspaper articles.32 And in Albrecht v.
Walker, a case involving a defendant accused of brewing beer without a
license,33 the court found a juror should not have been permitted to sit
who had said he would “do anything, short of inciting a mob, to put down
the manufacture of beer . . . .”34
By the end of the nineteenth century, the possibility of a juror “setting
aside” any predisposition they might have was gaining favor in the courts.
As the court held in Coughlin v. People,
[The law] makes the statement of [a] juror that he can render a fair and
impartial verdict, according to the law and the evidence, competent as
bearing upon the question of his impartiality, and requires the court to
hear and consider such statement, if the juror sees fit to make it; and the
result, therefore, would seem to be that the question of the competency
of a juror, as affected by his opinion, based upon rumor or newspaper
statements, must in all cases be treated as a question of fact.35

Likewise, by 1876, the Illinois Supreme Court had found that no one
28. Noble v. People, 1 Ill. 54, 55 (1822).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Smith v. Eames, 4 Ill. 76, 78 (1841); see also Albrecht v. Walker, 73 Ill. 69, 72 (1874)
(“Life, liberty [n]or property would . . . be safe with such a man. Lamentable indeed would be the
condition of each and of all, if the jury box shall be occupied by men who are governed by [such]
mean [prejudices]—by men who fancy themselves pre-eminently virtuous and good, in proportion
as they are bigoted and fanatical.”).
32. See Gray v. People, 26 Ill. 344, 346 (1861) (“[H]e declared on his examination, that he
believed the statements in the newspapers that there had been a housebreaking, and if the prisoners
were the persons named in the newspapers, he had an opinion of their guilt or innocence . . . . The
prisoner ought not to be forced to encounter a preëxisting opinion, deliberately formed on statements believed to be true, and which he would be required to remove. Had the witness said he
neither believed nor disbelieved the statements, he would have been competent.”).
33. Albrecht v. Walker, 73 Ill. 69–70 (1874).
34. Id. at 72.
35. Coughlin v. People, 33 N.E. 1, 14 (Ill. 1893).
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who has not exhausted their peremptory challenges has standing to appeal
an erroneous decision on a challenge for cause.36 In Robinson v. Randall,
the court found that, so long as counsel had at least one peremptory available to them, the conclusion was fairly drawn that their client was “not
injured by the ruling of the court . . . .”37
The two most significant obstacles to any appeal from the denial of a
challenge for cause have since remained the need to exhaust one’s peremptory challenges38 and the deference which must be afforded to the
trial court on any questions of fact that arise during the voir dire.39 The
availability of peremptory challenges remains an important factor in the
voir dire for any criminal or civil trial in Illinois. On the one hand, they
provide a safeguard against judicial bias, their use is largely left to the
discretion of the litigants, and their availability ensures that the parties
have at least some ability to take part in the selection process. On the
other, they help to limit the number of meritless appeals because no one
can be heard to complain about the character of the jury deciding their
case as long as they had retained an ability to change that character.
III. WHAT IS REQUIRED OF JURORS UNDER ILLINOIS LAW
Given the historic role that peremptory challenges have played in Illinois, the value of preserving what good has come from that history cannot
be overstated. There is still reason, however, to consider whether some
change in the process might help answer some of the problems that still
arise in this state. Cases involving claims of intentional discrimination
still arise with startling frequency, as evidenced by the recent decisions
in Little, Trejo, and Bradshaw,40 so there is reason to at least consider
Justice Stevens’s admonitions in Purkett and the ways in which Illinois
might effectuate such changes in the process.
36. Robinson v. Randall, 82 Ill. 521, 522–23 (1876).
37. Id. at 522–23. The dissent in Robinson was short and to the point. Id. at 524 (Dickey, J.,
dissenting) (“The position is taken that no injury can be done to a party where he challenges a juror
for cause, and his challenge is improperly overruled, and the juror is challenged peremptorily, if it
turns out afterwards that the party making such challenge does not, in selecting the other jurors,
exhaust all his peremptory challenges. This position seems to me untenable. No one can tell how
many of those subsequently accepted jurors he would have challenged peremptorily, if he had not
already expended one of his challenges upon the offensive juror in question.”).
38. See, e.g., People v. Bowens, 943 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (stating that the
Court will only review a lower court’s ruling on a challenge for cause after one exhausts their
peremptory challenges).
39. See Ittersagen v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 2021 IL 126507, ¶¶ 45–46, 51 (“[R]ooting
out juror bias necessarily involves assessing the juror’s credibility, which is especially significant
when, as here, the juror is the sole source of evidence.”).
40. See People v. Little, 2021 IL App (1st) 191108, ¶ 41 (concluding that petitioner demonstrated prejudice); People v. Trejo, 2021 IL App (2d) 190424, ¶ 16 (noting claim of purposeful
discrimination); People v. Bradshaw, 177 N.E.3d 396, 405–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020) (detailing
charges of intentional discrimination).
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Justice Stevens agreed with the Eighth Circuit that a peremptory challenge should not survive a Batson hearing, once a prima facie case was
established, unless counsel could articulate how the challenge was not
“facially irrelevant to the question of whether [the prospective juror was]
qualified to serve as a juror in the particular case.”41 He agreed with that
court’s conclusion that counsel should be expected to “at least articulate
some plausible race-neutral reason for believing [whatever factors they
considered would] somehow affect the person’s ability to perform his or
her duties as a juror.”42
There is little in the way of precedent to define what specific inquiry
would be necessary to get to the question of whether a particular challenge is in fact “related to the case to be tried,” but the case law about
what areas of inquiry should be permitted certainly provides something
of a starting point. To determine whether anyone should be sworn in as a
juror for a given trial, the same three concerns should always warrant
inquiry: (1) whether they will fairly consider the evidence presented to
them; (2) whether they will follow the law as instructed by the court; and
(3) whether they will abide by their obligations as members of a jury,
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, to deliberate and decide the case before them on the merits.43
To illustrate how these factors bear on a juror’s ability to serve, one
noteworthy example of how an inability to follow the law can prove dispositive is Morgan v. Illinois. In Morgan, the Illinois Supreme Court had
affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding (among other things) that
there was no error in refusing to ask prospective jurors whether they
41. Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1994), rev’d per curiam, 514 U.S. 765, 767
(1995); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 774 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
Eighth Circuit’s conclusions).
42. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767 (per curiam) (quoting Elem, 25 F.3d at 683); see also Purkett, 514
U.S. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Eighth Circuit’s conclusions); In re A.S., 65
N.E.3d 485, 497 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (“Whatever idea the trial judge meant to convey by his . . .
comment [that he agreed with the dissent in Batson], he was not at liberty to follow the reasoning
of a dissent in a controlling United States Supreme Court case. And while prosecuting attorneys
may offer any race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory, including the way a member of the
venire looks and acts, such subjective observations should be subject to close scrutiny.”).
43. Adopting a more stringent standard for the exercise of peremptory challenges in Illinois
would also help to correct the wrongs Justice Stevens said went unaddressed in Holland. Holland
v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). In Holland, a case in which the petitioner did not argue equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that the State’s
use of peremptory challenges to exclude African American jurors as a class ran afoul of the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Id. at 487–88.
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, observed that, “[r]ather than eliminating jurors on an individualized basis on the grounds of partiality or necessity, the prosecutor allegedly removed all the black
jurors in the belief that no black citizen could be a satisfactory juror or could fairly try the case. As
the Court acknowledges, that practice is ‘obviously’ unlawful. . . . A jury that is the product of such
a racially discriminatory selection process cannot possibly be an ‘impartial jury’ within the meaning
of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 505–06.
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would automatically vote for the death penalty regardless of any mitigation evidence.44 The United States Supreme Court reversed that decision,
however, finding that counsel was entitled to pursue an inquiry on the
subject of whether prospective jurors would consider mitigation evidence. The Court found, in fact, that any juror who was unwilling to consider such evidence would necessarily be unable to follow the law as instructed:
Any juror who states that he or she will automatically vote for the death
penalty without regard to the mitigating evidence is announcing an intention not to follow the instructions to consider the mitigating evidence
and to decide if it is sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. . . . Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court recognizes that jurors are
not impartial if they would automatically vote for the death penalty, and
that questioning in the manner petitioner requests is a direct and helpful
means of protecting a defendant’s right to an impartial jury. The State
has not suggested otherwise in this Court. . . . Any juror to whom mitigating factors are . . . irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that
juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without
basis in the evidence developed at trial. Accordingly, the defendant in
this case was entitled to have the inquiry made that he proposed to the
trial judge.45

There is a nexus between what questions are relevant to challenges for
cause and a given candidate’s ability to serve as a member of the jury,
just as the same level of inquiry has been found appropriate to determine
the propriety of a peremptory challenge. It is notably the case that “silly”
and “superstitious” reasons have never been specifically found necessary
in this context, but questions about a juror’s ability to serve—their willingness to fairly consider the evidence, follow the law, and deliberate
with other jurors to reach a just verdict—are routinely allowed.
IV. WHAT AREAS OF INQUIRY MAY BE EXPLORED IN VOIR DIRE
One aspect of the law of jury selection which bears particular scrutiny,
in the context of this question, is the dichotomy between what questions
are allowed to be asked in voir dire and what reasons an attorney may
give to justify the exercise of a peremptory challenge. On the one hand,
the Supreme Court has held that peremptory challenges may be used to
excuse prospective jurors for even the most “superstitious” or “silly”
44. See People v. Morgan, 568 N.E.2d 755, 778 (1991), rev’d, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (“The defendant also contends that he was denied an impartial jury when the trial court refused to ask potential jurors if they would automatically impose the death penalty if they found the defendant
guilty. During jury selection, the defendant requested that the trial court ask prospective jurors: ‘If
you found Derrick Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty no
matter what the facts are?’ The trial court denied this request.”).
45. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 738–39 (1992).
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reasons, so long as the decision is not motivated by discriminatory intent.46 On the other hand, while courts have also repeatedly held that
counsel should be allowed to pursue questioning relevant to their ability
to peremptorily challenge prospective jurors,47 there isn’t any precedent,
at least that the research for this article has disclosed, for the idea that
this, too, should be guided by superstition or silliness.48 To the contrary,
although every state in the union (save one) has specifically found that
the subject matter of voir dire should be limited only by its relevance to
peremptory challenges,49 that limit is consistently defined, in practice, by
whether the inquiry bears on prospective jurors’ ability to perform their
legal duties as jurors. Areas of inquiry that do not at least potentially bear
on the propriety of a challenge for cause—despite the rhetoric about what
little should be required for peremptory challenges—are generally refused by the trial court.
This is a dichotomy that the Illinois courts have yet to confront but that
at least one appellate court judge in Texas has specifically addressed (albeit in a dissenting opinion on the subject):
From the dicta in [some of our prior cases] has grown the doctrine of a
right to ask questions to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges.
That the doctrine rests on dicta and fallacy may not be a sufficient justification to abandon it, and I do not say that it is sufficient. More important is the failure of the courts to consider the differences between
the right to a qualified jury and the right to eliminate unfavorable jurors.
46. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam).
47. See, e.g., Art Press, Ltd. v. W. Printing Mach., 791 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A trial
judge has broad discretion in limiting the voir dire of potential jurors, but this discretion is subject
to the parties’ right to an impartial jury. To protect this right, a trial court ‘should permit a reasonably extensive examination of prospective jurors so that the parties have a basis for an intelligent
exercise of the right to challenge.’ . . . This court ‘has been zealous in its protection of probing voir
dire,’ and will reverse a trial court for abuse of its discretion ‘when limitations placed on the parameters of voir dire threaten to undermine the purpose for conducting an examination of prospective jurors.’” (internal citations omitted)).
48. But see People v. Baker, 924 P.2d 1186, 1190 (Colo. App. 1996). The trial court prosecuting
attorney in Baker offered, as justification for a peremptory challenge, that an African American
woman the attorney was questioning “did seem to react negatively towards me for even raising the
issue [when he pointed out that she and the defendant were both black and asked her if that would
matter].” Id. He continued, “I’m assuming that I handled it poorly, but I am not sure that that’s
necessarily the case. She’s the only black juror that I’m aware of on this panel [. . . and] the impression that I got [was] that she resented me bringing it up at all. And based on that I believe that
she would not be the best juror to hear this case.” Id. The Court found that “[c]ounsel’s justification
suggests that the ultimate reason for making the challenge was based on the juror’s resentment of
the questions. Under these circumstances, racial discrimination was not inherent in the explanation
offered.” Id.
49. See Kidder v. State, 256 A.3d 829, 835 (Md. 2021) (“This Court has frequently emphasized
that, unlike courts in many other jurisdictions, Maryland courts allow only ‘limited voir dire’—
meaning that the sole purpose of voir dire questioning is to determine whether prospective jurors
should be struck for cause, not to elicit information for the exercise of peremptory strikes in the
second stage of jury selection.”).
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. . . Questioning about [a juror’s qualification to serve] is essential to
attaining a qualified jury. The statutory provision of peremptory challenges [on the other hand] provides a method of obtaining a more favorable jury, but it does not include a procedure of asking questions to
implement the use of the challenges. There is no right to a favorable
jury. . . . [So, g]iven the inadequate jurisprudential basis for this doctrine, its irreconcilable conflict with [other law], the impossibility of its
predictable application, the effect it has in unduly lengthening the process of jury selection, and the development of alternate sources of information [such as juror questionnaires], I would renounce it. 50

There is a great deal of argument in the cases over the subject matter
about which counsel should be permitted to ask prospective jurors, the
use of hypothetical questions or sentence structures which tend toward
indoctrination,51 and even the fundamental question of whether counsel
should be allowed to ask their own questions.52 But the reasons counsel
may offer for why they peremptorily excuse a prospective juror, regardless of how that choice may affect the jury’s makeup or diversity, are
likely to be upheld no matter how “superstitious, silly, or trivial,”53 “implausible or fantastic”54 they may be. Indeed, as one Illinois appellate
court concluded, “[a] legitimate race-neutral reason [for excusing a prospective juror] is not [necessarily] a reason that makes sense, but [may
just be] a reason that does not deny equal protection.”55
It remains a constant source of criticism, leveled by those who would
eliminate peremptory challenges altogether, that peremptory challenges
are allowed in such meaningless circumstances—and Purkett remains to
blame for this state of affairs.56 So, Illinois should again consider the
50. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 44–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Womack, J., concurring).
51. See Ted A. Donner, Limits on Questioning Prospective Jurors: The Rule Against “Indoctrination,” in 2 BLUE’S GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION, APP’X O (2022) (discussing a case where the
prosecution may have used hypotheticals to emphasize the State’s theory of case).
52. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 234 (“The court may permit the parties to submit additional [voir dire]
questions to it for further inquiry if it thinks they are appropriate, and shall permit the parties to
supplement the examination by such direct inquiry as the court deems proper for a reasonable period of time depending upon the length of examination by the court, the complexity of the case, and
the nature and extent of the damages.”).
53. United States v. Tercier, 835 Fed. App’x 471, 479 (11th Cir. 2020).
54. Stevens v. Commonwealth, 826 S.E.2d 895, 904 (Va. App. 2019); see also Bell v. State,
287 So.3d 944, 957 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
55. Mack v. Anderson, 861 N.E.2d 280, 292 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
56. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s
Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 837 (1997) (“How exactly is a trial judge to decide whether a
prosecutor’s exclusion of the only black men in a venire is or is not race-based, when the proffered
neutral explanation is that they have facial hair, and they are the only ones in the entire venire with
facial hair? What if the proffered reason is something more closely associated with race, such as
having curly hair? By dispensing with any plausibility requirement at step two of the Batson inquiry, the Purkett Court may be making it marginally more difficult for trial courts at step three to
separate out nonsensical reasons that are truly race-neutral from nonsensical reasons that may indeed be pretextual.”).
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possibility of looking at the problem from a different angle and restricting
the use of peremptory challenges in a manner consistent with the standards Justice Stevens advocated in his dissent in Purkett, so that all of the
questioning and subsequent challenges, including both challenges for
cause and peremptories, relate to whether the prospective jurors are in
fact able to do what is required of them under the applicable law.
V. WASHINGTON STATE’S FOCUS ON IMPLICIT BIAS
“Project Implicit,” which started in the 1990s with an online program
called the Implicit Association Test (IAT), provides a way for anyone
interested in learning about themselves to take anonymous tests that
gauge which unconscious biases they might have.57 The IAT, which has
been since taken by millions and is still available today,58 asks that visitors to the site view a number of images as they are prompted to make
choices along the way. An IAT keeps track of both what choices a user
makes and the time that elapses between each choice, because hesitancy
in making a decision can be telling (the user having presumably paused
to consider what the “right” answer should be).59 The IAT thus demonstrates how people are inclined to stereotype, and it shows us how we
tend to rely upon mental associations from learned biases, whether we
know it or not.
Implicit bias affects all of us in ways we don’t always realize:
A father and his son are in a car accident. The father dies at the scene
and the son, badly injured, is rushed to the hospital. In the operating
room, the surgeon looks at the boy and says, “I can't operate on this boy,
he is my son.” . . . If your immediate reaction is puzzlement, that’s because automatic mental associations caused you to think “male” on
reading “surgeon.” The association surgeon = male is part of a stereotype. In this riddle, the stereotype works as the first piece of a mindbug.
The second piece is an error in judgment—in this case a failure or delay
in figuring out that the surgeon must be the boy’s mother. . . . For those
who are strong believers in women’s equal rights and abilities, being
tripped up by this riddle is especially annoying. Feminists are not likely
to suspect that they possess the automatic surgeon = male association—
57. Overview, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2022) [https://perma.cc/Z8PH-6JWT]; see also People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶
152 (Neville, J., dissenting) (“I would amend Rule 431(b) by mandating that a pretrial questionnaire
be sent prior to trial to every prospective criminal trial juror [which includes a version of the Implicit Association Test such as that included as Appendix B to Justice Neville’s dissent]. [Such a]
pretrial questionnaire can be used to familiarize jurors with legal principles, e.g., proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and implicit and unconscious bias.”).
58. See, e.g., Preliminary Information, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html [https://perma.cc/VKQ8-APGC].
59. TED A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY SELECTION STRATEGY & SCIENCE § 20:6
(2020–21 ed.).
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but most of them do. Consider that feminist just a bit further. Why
should he base his thinking on a stereotype that clashes with his personal views? (Did you just discover that you have a feminist = female
association?)60

The implications this study has had for how the courts should treat the
likelihood of unconscious bias in jury selection and in jury deliberations
remain daunting problems for all concerned. As Justice Michael Hyman
observed in an article for the Illinois Bar Journal, “In our role as lawyers
and judges we must be conscious of implicit bias’ hold on us. . . . [Indeed], [t]he phenomenon of implicit bias must be addressed if we are really determined to eliminate bias, ‘root and branch,’ from our legal system.”61
Justice Hyman’s reference to both the “root and branch” of the problem is certainly apt, given how difficult it is to tell how deep these particular roots may run, but he is not alone in his thinking, and it is at least
clear that a great many others in Illinois share his commitment to working
on the problem. In 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court introduced a new
pattern jury instruction, IPI 1.08, that encourages jurors to think about
which implicit biases they may harbor before they decide the case in front
of them.62 As this article was being completed, the state’s legal community was considering an amendment to Rule 8.4 of the state’s ethics rules
to confirm that “professional misconduct” should be defined to include
“conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment
or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status
60. MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF
GOOD PEOPLE 71–72 (2013).
61. Hon. Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, ILL. BAR J., Jan. 2014, at 40, 47. See
also DONNER & GABRIEL, supra note 59, §20:6 (“The courts are taking these studies seriously, it
bears emphasizing. The American Bar Association’s Judiciary Division, for example, published a
special edition of its Judges’ Journal in the Fall of 2015 focused entirely on implicit bias and its
impact on the way court proceedings unfold. As one of the judges contributing to that issue wrote,
there is value in understanding one’s own implicit biases and guarding against them.” (citing Judge
Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of Implicit Bias?, 54 JUDGES’ J. 4 (2015))).
62. The pattern jury instruction states:
We all have feelings, assumptions, perceptions, fears, and stereotypes about others.
Some biases we are aware of and others we might not be fully aware of, which is why
they are called “implicit biases” or “unconscious biases.”
Our biases often affect how we act, favorably or unfavorably, toward someone. Bias
can affect our thoughts, how we remember, what we see and hear, whom we believe or
disbelieve, and how we make important decisions.
As jurors you are being asked to make very important decisions in this case. You must
resist jumping to conclusions based on personal likes or dislikes. You must not let bias,
prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision. You must not be biased in favor of
or against any party or witness because of his or her disability, gender, race, religion,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin, or socioeconomic status . . . .
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.08 (approved May 2018).
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or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.”63 And
as Kendra Abercrombie and Jayne Reardon pointed out in an article for
the Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Professionalism:
In Illinois, our courts and judges have created educational tools, resources, and trainings to support judges in understanding and disrupting
possible biases so they can render fair judgments.
Since December 2018, Dr. Andrea Miller, a clinical assistant professor of psychology at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign and
a senior court research associate at the National Center for State Courts,
and Judge Joseph G. McGraw of the 17th Judicial Circuit have conducted a deliberative decision-making training at Illinois’ biennial Judicial Education Conference and during seminars for new judges in the
state.
The training introduces judges to the science behind implicit bias
and fosters an awareness that judges, like all people, aren’t immune to
the influence of implicit bias.
There isn’t a clear path from implicit bias to discriminatory decisionmaking, explained Kimberly Ackmann, Deputy Trial Court Administrator to Judge McGraw. However, the training teaches how being motivated to control potential biases can determine how those biases manifest and what judicial officers can do to interrupt the cycle.64

While the Illinois courts have been encouraging in-depth study and
some initial steps to address this problem in the community, other states
have concluded that more aggressive approaches are necessary. In State
v. Saintcalle, for example, a 2013 opinion that runs for almost 100
pages,65 the Washington Supreme Court concluded that what is now
known about implicit bias should serve as a wake-up call, demonstrating
that the entire process is in need of an overhaul. “With limited information and time,” the court concluded in Saintcalle, “and a lack of any
reliable way to determine the subtle biases of each prospective juror, attorneys tend to rely heavily on stereotypes and generalizations in deciding
63. Michelle Silverthorn, Banning Harassment in the Legal Profession, WOMEN’S BAR ASS’N
ILL. (Aug. 18, 2016), https://wbaillinois.org/banning-harassment-in-the-legal-profession/
[https://perma.cc/MB3R-3EY2]. “Shouldn’t we hold ourselves to a higher standard? Our profession is certainly better than it was fifty, or even twenty years ago. But we still have work to do. And
it’s easy for us attorneys to identify problems. It’s what we do. Offering solutions though, that’s
less easy.” Id.
64. Kendra Abercrombie & Jayne Reardon, Interrupting Implicit Bias in the Illinois Judiciary,
2CIVILITY (July 29, 2021), https://www.2civility.org/interrupting-implicit-bias-in-the-illinois-judiciary/ [https://perma.cc/Q7FF-KN78]; see also People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 152 (Neville,
J., dissenting) (“This court can take judicial notice of the fact that the United States incarcerates
more people than any other country in the world and that the largest percentage of the people incarcerated are people of color. In light of [these] facts, absent a discussion of implicit bias with
each juror during voir dire, there is an impermissible risk that jurors’ individual biases will influence their jury deliberations.”).
65. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326 (Wash. 2013).
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how to exercise peremptory challenges.”66 The court found there were
“too many unanswered questions . . . under Batson, which [would] continue to cause much confusion and impose substantial litigation costs, all
without addressing the underlying problem” of bias in jury selection.67
The court in Saintcalle committed to introducing mechanisms that they
hope will address the prevalence of bias in jury selection, including ways
to acknowledge and deal with the fact that implicit bias, not just intentional discrimination, plays a part in perpetuating the institutional racism
endemic to the process.68
The Washington State courts then introduced General Rule 37, which
requires that trial courts refuse to allow the exercise of a peremptory challenge, regardless of whether there is evidence of intentional discrimination, so long as there is evidence to support the conclusion that “race or
ethnicity [was] a factor.”69 The rule requires that a trial court “presume”
that the reasons given for a peremptory challenge are the result of “improper discrimination” if there is evidence to show counsel relied upon
such suspect criteria as whether the juror had “prior contact with law enforcement officers,” had expressed “a distrust of law enforcement or a
belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling,” or had “a
close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime.”70
Rule 37 may thus be seen as a step forward by those who want to see
the problem in jury selection addressed71—the rule’s admonition against
reliance on some of what has been described as pretext under Purkett

66. Id. at 353 (González, J., concurring) (citing TED A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY
SELECTION: STRATEGY AND SCIENCE §§1–7 to 1–8 (3d ed. 2007)).
67. Id. at 360 (citing TED A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY SELECTION: STRATEGY
AND SCIENCE §§1–7 to 1–8 (3d ed. 2007)).
68. See id. at 336 (opinion of Wiggins, J.) (“Unconscious stereotyping upends the Batson framework. Batson is equipped to root out only ‘purposeful’ discrimination, which many trial courts
probably understand to mean conscious discrimination. But discrimination in this day and age is
frequently unconscious and less often consciously purposeful. That does not make it any less pernicious.” (internal citations omitted)).
69. See WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 37(e) (“The court shall then evaluate the reasons given to
justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of circumstances. If the court determines
that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge, then the peremptory challenge shall be denied. The court need not find purposeful discrimination to deny the peremptory challenge. The court should explain its ruling on the record.”).
70. WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 37(h).
71. See, e.g., Anona Su, A Proposal to Properly Address Implicit Bias in the Jury, 31 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 91 (2020) (“[Rule 37] is aimed at stopping attorneys from using race-based
peremptory challenges at not only a conscious and explicit bias level, but also at an implicit, unconscious, and systematic bias level. Washington is the first state to put these challenges in the
forefront to be constantly addressed by attorneys and judges alike. It is extremely innovative and
should help reduce jury selection bias issues. This statewide rule is revolutionary. It addresses implicit bias in a way unlike courts have in the past and attempts to address what Batson did not.”).
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would certainly seem to be just such a step72—but it could also be said
that Rule 37 serves to perpetuate some of the very problems it is intended
to cure.
In stark contrast to the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent decision in State
v. Ittersagen, in which the court reiterated the importance of deferring to
the trial court on questions of fact,73 in Washington v. Lahman, an appellate court in that state reversed the conviction of a defendant who had
been “arrested for the brutal assault of his long-term girlfriend” because
the court concluded that the analysis under Rule 37 was “purely objective”74 and reversal was appropriate because “the record left open the possibility that the prosecution implicitly and unsuitably relied on a stereotype in deciding [that one prospective juror] lacked the frame of mind to
side with the State.”75 The court found that
[o]ur assessment of this case does not mean the prosecutor’s decision to
strike [this prospective juror] was in fact driven by improper discrimination, purposeful or not. GR 37 was written in terms of possibilities,
not actualities. The rule recognizes the trial process must be free from
the appearance of discrimination, regardless of actual motives or intent.
The switch from Batson’s focus on purposeful discrimination to GR
37’s emphasis on the objective possibility of discrimination is significant.76

As the Illinois Appellate Court observed in Mesich v. Austin, “[i]t is an
old, legal truism that ‘hard cases make bad law,’”77 and so it may be with
Washington State’s Rule 37. Indeed, while “[h]aving prior contact with
law enforcement officers” is one reason that the Washington State courts
are now required to presume intentional discrimination,78 it is not at all
uncommon for criminal-defense attorneys in Illinois to be concerned over
whether a prospective juror has a relationship with police,79 just as
72. See WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 37(i) (“The following reasons for peremptory challenges also
have historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection in Washington
State: allegations that the prospective juror was sleeping, inattentive, or staring or failing to make
eye contact; exhibited a problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor; or provided unintelligent or confused answers.”).
73. See Ittersagen v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 2021 IL 126507, ¶ 51 (discussing juror
bias and validating their credibility).
74. State v. Lahman, 488 P.3d 881, 882, 885 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
75. Id. at 886.
76. Id.
77. Mesich v. Austin, 217 N.E.2d 574, 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966).
78. WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 37(h).
79. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 596 N.E.2d 1363, 1365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“Your Honor, I think
that [this juror]’s familiarity with members of the police force, including Police Lieutenant Reno,
is a problem which may prejudice [him] against my client, and I would ask that the Court remove
[him] for cause or that in the alternative I be granted an additional peremptory challenge based on
the Court’s earlier rulings to remove [him].” (quoting defense counsel)); see also People v. Brooks,
542 N.E.2d 64, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“The Court: ‘Yeah. I would hope all people would tell the
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prosecutors are often concerned with whether prospective jurors have
criminal records or other experience with the police that could lead them
to have a negative impression of such witnesses.80 The State of Washington has such assumptions baked into its law on the subject, it bears emphasizing, because its law is focused on whether such assumptions might
be borne of implicit bias. A more constructive standard might well focus
instead on whether such evidence is relevant to a given juror’s ability to
serve.
VI. ARIZONA STATE’S ELIMINATION OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The most effective way to curtail the use of stereotypes in peremptory
challenges, according to the Arizona Supreme Court, is not to search for
implicit bias in what motivates counsel to exercise such challenges, as
they are doing in Washington, but to eliminate peremptory challenges altogether.81 This dramatic change in Arizona law was the recommendation
of two appellate-court judges who had first advocated for a new rule like
that embraced by Washington.82 Then, in the course of debate over how
peremptory challenges were used in one particular case before them,83
both the Arizona Supreme Court and the state’s bar association changed

truth. But the thrust of the question is whether you would believe the policeman and give his credit
more weight or more credibility than the testimony of a citizen like yourself solely because he is a
police official.’ [Prospective Juror]: ‘I think so.’”).
80. See, e.g., People v. Baisten, 560 N.E.2d 1060, 1071 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“The trial court
refused to excuse him for cause, but found that the State’s use of a peremptory strike against him
on account of his criminal record was racially neutral and legitimate.”); but see People v. Horton,
78 N.E.3d 489, 503 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017):
The negative interactions between the police and members of the community form
the basis of minority communities’ fear and distrust of police. And thus, it is not difficult
to imagine why a young black man having a conversation with friends in a front yard
would quickly move inside when seeing a police car back up.
In 2015, the American Civil Liberties Union identified a historical pattern of disproportionate stops from May through August 2014 in Chicago. Black Chicagoans were
subjected to 72% of all stops even though this demographic constitutes just 32% of the
city's population. During the same time, more than 250,000 stops –primarily of Blacks–
did not lead to an arrest. . . . Not only law enforcement, but also a significant proportion
of the public, implicitly perceive young black men as a threat and more likely to be
involved in criminal activity.
Id. (citing Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 354 (2007)).
81. Arizona Supreme Court, No. R-21-0020, supra note 16.
82. See Kanu, supra note 16 (identifying Arizona appellate judges Peter Swann and Paul
McMurdie as advocating Arizona adopt rules like Washington’s).
83. See State v. Porter, 460 P.3d 1276, 1283 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020) (“We agree with the dissent
that our state supreme court could (and should) improve the Batson framework to promote the
Supreme Court’s purpose.”).
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their recommendation to propose elimination of peremptory challenges.84
Arizona’s Supreme Court then vacated the appellate court decision in that
case,85 entering soon thereafter the order amending Arizona Rules 18.4
and 18.5, which eliminated the use of peremptory challenges statewide.86
The result was a new rule which, although barely noticed at the time, has
quickly inflamed debate in other states87 and prompted Arizona’s state
legislature to introduce an “emergency” measure to restore at least some
number of peremptory challenges,88 a measure which had not passed as
this article was completed.89
Whether this Arizona experiment will prove constructive is anybody’s
guess, given that the rule in question is not yet a year old. Still, while
there is plenty of reason to be concerned with how peremptory challenges
are used, the idea that there is some good to be had from taking the peremptories away from counsel altogether—so that every decision over
who should be excused from the venire would have to be the subject of a
challenge for cause which is ruled on by the judge—would certainly seem
84. Howard Fischer, Court Aims to End Racial Bias in Jury Selection with New Rules, ARIZ.
CAPITOL TIMES (August 29, 2021), https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2021/08/29/court-aims-toend-racial-bias-in-jury-selection-with-new-rules/ [https://perma.cc/DMA3-PE4H].
[T]he Supreme Court justices accepted the recommendation of two judges from the state
Court of Appeals, Peter Swann and Paul McMurdie, who argued that the move will go
a long way to eliminating persistent problems with juries that often do not reflect the
racial and ethnic backgrounds of their communities. “The primary tool by which this
discrimination is practiced is the peremptory strike,” they wrote in their petition. No one
has disputed that lawyers have used peremptory challenges to fashion a jury they think
will be more favorable to their arguments. But the appellate judges noted this is not
anything guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution. In fact, they said, most states did not allow
for it until after the Civil War. “A cynical observer might note that the power came into
being in the years after black Americans obtained the right to serve on juries,” they
wrote.
Id.
85. State v. Porter, 491 P.3d 1100, 1108–09 (Ariz. 2021) (“We also express our confidence that
trial judges—who are in a better position to discern the intent and demeanor of prosecutors and
jurors—are uniquely situated to determine whether peremptory challenges are being used to discriminate against minority jurors.”).
86. Arizona Supreme Court, No. R-21-0020, supra note 16.
87. See, e.g., Commentary, New Jersey Needs and Open Discussion on the Future of Peremptory Challenges, N.J. L.J. ONLINE (Sept. 12, 2021), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2021/09/12/new-jersey-needs-an-open-discussion-on-the-future-of-peremptory-challenges/?slreturn=20220326012957 [https://perma.cc/PPC5-MKW5 ] (“Has the time come to give
serious consideration to elimination or serious restriction of the peremptory challenge? We think it
is much too premature for us to be able to give any informed opinion on the underlying substantive
question. But we do take to heart the court’s entreaty that the legal community be willing to engage
in a ‘probing conversation’ and not summarily close off serious discussion merely due to the ancient
provenance and engrained tradition underlying the practice.”).
88. See HB2413, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2022) (“This act is an emergency measure that
is necessary to preserve the public peace, health or safety . . . .”).
89. On February 28, 2022, the bill failed by a 28-29-3 margin to advance from the Arizona
House to the Senate. HB2413, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., Bill Status (Ariz. 2022),
https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/BillOverview/76919 [https://perma.cc/6Z2Z-KYKB].
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to be one that deserves more scrutiny than it has gotten. There have not
been a great many studies on the question of whether judges are likely to
render decisions guided by their own implicit biases, after all, but those
which have been conducted all tell the same story.
The simple truth is that “judges harbor the same kinds of implicit biases as [everybody else and] these biases can influence their judgment.”90
In fact, one recent study found that, no matter how well intentioned they
may be otherwise, judges tend to not only be “just as biased [but in some
cases appear to be] even more biased than the general public in deciding
court cases . . . .”91 As another 2017 study of over 200 judges concluded,
our findings confirm that the federal and state judges we surveyed indeed harbored strong to moderate negative implicit biases about groups
that are largely viewed not as subordinated but rather as American success stories. In light of the heavy ethical burden resting on the shoulders
of judges—and lifetime-appointed federal judges in particular—these
results are concerning. The biases revealed by the study focused on the
judges’ implicit judgments of morality, connecting group membership
with traits such as scheming, dominating, and controlling, and manifested without regard to judges’ length of service, age, or type of judgeship. Thus, the primary message revealed by the study is that implicit
biases, even about groups not usually discussed in the national conversation of discrimination, may be lurking as part of a complex, deep, and
hidden network of cognitive associations, even in the most egalitarian
of judges.92

For these reasons, to say that implicit bias can somehow be avoided by
taking the decision away from one group of biased people, who at least
have competing interests to keep each other in check, and turning it over
to someone else, who studies have confirmed will be just as prone to the
90. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195 (2009).
91. Stephen Waldron, Gender Roles Highlight Gender Bias in Judicial Decisions, SOC’Y PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. (April 3, 2018), https://www.spsp.org/news-center/press-releases/gender-judicial-bias [https://perma.cc/95W3-5YDD] (“This study examined the role of gender bias relating to judges and legal decisions, and the sex discrimination worked both ways, sometimes
against women and sometimes against men. ‘These results show that judges’ ideology and life
experiences might influence their court decisions,’ said Andrea Miller, PhD, a visiting assistant
professor of psychology at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. ‘Many judges are not able
to factor out their personal beliefs while they are considering court cases, even when they have the
best possible intentions.’”).
92. Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of Judicial
Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 110 (2017); see also Rachlinski et al., supra note 90, at 1210–11
(“Because we used a commonly administered version of the IAT [Implicit Association Test], we
are able to compare the results of our study to the results of other studies involving ordinary adults.
We found that the black judges produced IAT scores comparable to those observed in the sample
of black subjects obtained on the Internet. The white judges, on the other hand, demonstrated a
statistically significantly stronger white preference than that observed among a sample of white
subjects obtained on the Internet.”).
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same biases, doesn’t make a whole lot of sense.93
VII. JURY SELECTION AS STATE ACTION
The legal community’s attempts at rooting out and eradicating institutional racism may be laudatory in the end, but the exercise has historically
required that people try to be “color blind” in how they look at things.94
That’s something Vernā Myers, Jerry Kang, and others engaged in the
study of implicit bias say ultimately runs contrary to what people actually
should be doing. What Myers advocates, for example, is that people
“walk boldly toward” their implicit biases, educate themselves about the
many wonderful people there are among every cognizable group, and ultimately embrace diversity.95 But while that may be what it takes to actually eliminate racism, sexism, and every other prejudice this community
may be challenged by, the fact remains that members of the venire—people drawn from a “fair cross section” of a community that still includes
bigots and misogynists—are themselves likely to harbor explicit and implicit biases that drive their thinking.
As one anonymous juror pointed out in a letter about their experience,
when all of the jurors in the deliberations are white, it is entirely possible
they will sink to the occasion:

93. See also Bennett, supra note 20, at 150 (“[P]ermitting judges to dominate the initial jury
selection causes more biased jurors to remain on a case and exacerbates the role of implicit bias in
jury trials. Additionally, the Batson process, which permits defendants to challenge a prosecutor’s
peremptory strikes of jurors if the strikes seem to have been racially motivated, is thoroughly inadequate. It both allows the implicit and explicit biases of attorneys to impact jury composition and
may provide a false veneer of racial neutrality to jury trials.”).
94. See also People v. Mack, 473 N.E.2d 880, 900 (Ill. 1984) (Simon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“In comparing the large percentage of blacks excluded with the smaller percentage in the pool of potential jurors, David Draper, a statistics professor at the University of
Chicago, said blacks were excluded at ‘well over double the rate you would have expected if the
peremptory challenges had been exercised in a color-blind fashion.’” (quoting Douglas Frantz,
Many Blacks Kept Off Juries Here, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 1984, at 1, 14).
95. See, e.g., Vernā Myers, How to Overcome Our Biases? Walk Boldly Toward Them, TED
(Nov.
14,
2014),
https://www.ted.com/talks/verna_myers_how_to_overcome_our_biases_walk_boldly_toward_them?language=en [https://perma.cc/R443-LYRH]. Myers advocated,
We gotta get out of denial. Stop trying to be good people. We need real people. . . .
[W]hat the scientists are telling us [in the studies on implicit bias] is, no way. Don’t even
think about color blindness. In fact, what they’re suggesting is, stare at awesome Black
people. Look at them directly in their faces and memorize them, because when we look
at awesome folks who are Black, it helps to dissociate the association that happens automatically in our brain. . . . [It can help to] reset your automatic associations about who
Black men are. I’m trying to remind you that young Black men grow up to be amazing
human beings who have changed our lives and made them better. . . . [T]hink Jeffrey
Dahmer and Colin Powell. Just stare at them, right? . . . [T]hese are the things. So go
looking for your bias. Please, please, just get out of denial and go looking for disconfirming data that will prove that in fact your old stereotypes are wrong.
Id.
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During deliberations, matter-of-fact expressions of bigotry and broadbrush platitudes about “those people” rolled off the tongues of a vocal
majority as naturally and unabashedly as if they were discussing the
weather. Shocked and sickened, I sat silently, rationalizing to myself
that since I did agree with the product, there was nothing to be gained
by speaking out against the process (I now regret my inaction). Had just
one African-American been sitting in that room, the content of discussion would have been quite different. And had the case been more balanced—one that hinged on fine distinction or subtle nuances—a more
diverse jury might have made a material difference in the outcome. I
pass these thoughts onto you in the hope that the jury system can some
day be improved.96

It may be easy enough to understand how an attorney, in this context,
could be tempted to use their peremptory challenges in ways that recognize how the implicit biases of a jury could serve their client’s cause.
After all, as Jerry Kang, Judge Bennett, and others working with them
concluded in a study in 2012, it remains true, for good or ill, that “racial
diversity in the jury alters deliberations.”97 Although a jury trial may be
said to inherently reflect the view of the community as much as any election,98 that does not mean that the courts or counsel should be studying
how to exploit the demographics of the venire the way the Pew Research
Center studies how different groups may be exploited to get their votes
in an election.99
To the contrary, while voters go to the poll to express their own selfinterest or beliefs, jurors are expected to abide by specific obligations, as
96. Hon. Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV.
1023, 1033 (2008) (quoting a letter from anonymous juror).
97. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1180 (2012).
In a mock jury experiment, [a researcher] compared the deliberation content of all-White
juries with that of racially diverse juries. Racially diverse juries processed information
in a way that most judges and lawyers would consider desirable: They had longer deliberations, greater focus on the actual evidence, greater discussion of missing evidence,
fewer inaccurate statements, fewer uncorrected statements, and greater discussion of
race-related topics. In addition to these information-based benefits, [the researcher]
found interesting predeliberation effects: Simply by knowing that they would be serving
on diverse juries (as compared to all-White ones), White jurors were less likely to believe, at the conclusion of evidence but before deliberations, that the Black defendant
was guilty.
Id. at 1180–81.
98. See Amar, supra note 22, at 206 (“[T]he link between jury service and other rights of political participation such as voting is an important part of our overall constitutional structure . . . .”).
99. See, e.g., Ruth Igielnik & Abby Budiman, The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of
the U.S. Electorate, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/2020/09/23/the-changing-racial-and-ethnic-composition-of-the-u-s-electorate/
[https://perma.cc/FK4K-QYZ5] (“[U]nderstanding the changing racial and ethnic composition in
key states helps to provide clues for how political winds may shift over time. The ways in which
these demographic shifts might shape electoral outcomes are closely linked to the distinct partisan
preferences of different racial and ethnic groups.”).

2022]

Illinois Courts Struggle with Implicit Bias

741

state actors. The process by which they are selected is one “which the
government alone administers,”100 so when counsel, also serving as state
actors, engage in voir dire, exercise peremptories, and argue challenges
for cause, they are essentially deciding who should be eligible for a specific government job. As the Supreme Court held in Edmonson:
A traditional function of government is evident here. The peremptory
challenge is used in selecting an entity that is a quintessential governmental body, having no attributes of a private actor. The jury exercises
the power of the court and of the government that confers the court’s
jurisdiction. As we noted in Powers, the jury system performs the critical governmental functions of guarding the rights of litigants and “ensur[ing] continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.”101

This means there is indeed reason to be concerned about what motivates counsel to exercise their peremptory challenges one way or another
and that means the days are over in which “the essential nature of the
peremptory challenges” should allow for a prospective juror’s exclusion
based upon “a real or imagined partiality . . . sudden impressions [or]
unaccountable prejudices.”102 Batson called for an end to such unfettered
use of peremptory challenges because the Court recognized that “the peremptory challenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures,
. . . [but the] reality of practice, amply reflected in many state- and federal-court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately
at times has been, used to discriminate against black jurors.”103
It is thus particularly disappointing that a study conducted twenty-five
years later by Kang and Bennett left its researchers “skeptical about peremptory challenges, which private parties deploy to decrease racial diversity in precisely those cases in which diversity is likely to matter
most.”104 Kang’s and Bennett’s group may not have been without cause
to reach that conclusion, given how onerous the burden is for anyone who
100. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991).
101. Id. at 624 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 404, 407 (1991)). Seeing prospective jurors as
government job candidates also suggests that the laws relating to their selection should be consistent
with those governing employment generally. A more heightened standard, such as that advocated
by Justice Stevens in his dissent from Purkett, is thus again more desirable because it is more consistent with what is required in employment-discrimination cases. Discrimination may be found in
the employment context, after all, whenever there is evidence that the employer’s claimed reason
for letting someone go is “unworthy of belief.” See, e.g., Venturelli v. ARC Cmty. Servs., 350 F.3d
592, 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[One category] of circumstantial evidence . . . which may suffice by
itself to establish discrimination . . . is evidence that the plaintiff was qualified for the position in
question but passed over in favor of a person not having the forbidden characteristic and that the
employer’s stated reason for its decision is ‘unworthy of belief [or] a mere pretext for discrimination.’” (internal citations omitted)).
102. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 106 (1986).
103. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98–99.
104. Kang et. al, supra note 97, at 1181.
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seeks to establish a Batson violation in a given case, but that burden could
be lessened both by taking the focus away from whether any bias in the
process was intentional (something which should be irrelevant, given
what we know about implicit bias) and by requiring what Justice Stevens
said should have been expected in Purkett v. Elem, a reason for the challenge related to the case to be tried.105
VIII. WHY ILLINOIS SHOULD CHANGE THE STANDARDS FOR PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
As the court held in People v. Williams,106 the current analysis under
Batson involves a great deal of focus on whether a particular attorney’s
use of a peremptory challenge was rooted in some unfounded prejudice
or bias that they may have harbored against the members of a particular
protected class:
Once a defendant alleges his or her rights have been violated because
the State has used its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
way, Batson requires the trial court conduct a three-part inquiry: (1) determine whether the defendant has established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination; once a prima facie case is shown, (2) the State
has the burden to articulate a nondiscriminatory, race-neutral explanation, based on the facts of the case; and considering the State's explanation, (3) the court then must determine whether the defendant has shown
purposeful discrimination.107

The seriousness of this standard is highlighted by the ABA’s recent
adoption of a Model Rule which makes it an ethics violation for counsel
to engage in any conduct in the practice of law which amounts to unlawful discrimination.108 If judges weren’t reluctant enough to chastise the
attorneys before them under Batson, this new rule would raise the stakes
in ways that could challenge any trial judge’s ability to keep perspective.
How likely is any court to find there has been purposeful discrimination
when that finding could mean that the attorney appearing before them
could be censured, suspended, or even disbarred because of that finding?
105. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 777–78 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. People v. Williams, 48 N.E.3d 1203, 1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
107. Id.
108. See Kristine A. Kubes et al., The Evolution of Model Rule 8.4(g): Working to Eliminate
Bias, Discrimination, and Harassment in the Practice of Law, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_construction/2019/spring/model-rule-8-4/ [https://perma.cc/4BTJ-RBH9] (describing the 2016 amendment
to rule 8.4(g)); but see also Erika Kubik, ISBA Assembly Opposes Adoption of 8.4(g) in Illinois,
2CIVILITY (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.2civility.org/isba-assembly-opposes-adoption-8-4g-illinois/
[https://perma.cc/CP42-74Y8] (“The ISBA Assembly believed the rule does not properly define
‘discrimination’ and ‘harassment’ to properly apply the Rule to achieve its intent. Model Rule
8.4(g) also raised a number of concerns about subjecting lawyers to unfounded disciplinary complaints.”).
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It may be that in some cases, counsel’s actions would in fact warrant
just such a result. In others—particularly given what is now known about
implicit bias—the court’s ability to protect the interests of the parties and
jurors under the Equal Protection Clause should not require that every
lawyer who falls victim to their own implicit bias should be caught in the
cross-hairs of an ethics charge.109 By limiting the circumstances in which
peremptory challenges are available to begin with, a trial court might
never need to reach the question of whether counsel’s motivations were
discriminatory in nature. Illinois law that governs the use of peremptory
challenges in both civil cases110 and criminal cases111 could be amended
to establish a more onerous standard than the “silly or superstitious” proviso embraced by the court in Purkett, while shifting the focus from counsel’s intent to the more important consequences of their actions. One possible version of such an amendment would incorporate the legal
principles discussed in this article as follows:
Peremptory challenges may be exercised hereunder only for reasons relevant to whether a prospective juror can perform their duties as a member of the jury. Such reasons include (1) whether the prospective juror
would follow the law as instructed by the court, (2) whether they would
fairly consider the evidence presented at trial, and (3) whether they
would be able and prepared to participate in deliberations with others
on the jury to reach a just and fair decision on the merits. For purposes
of this section, a prospective juror’s membership in a protected class, as
defined under the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/2-101, et
seq.), is irrelevant to whether they could perform their duties as a member of the jury.

With such a limitation on the statutory grant of peremptory challenges,
there would still be circumstances in which a Batson hearing would be
necessary (and in which the related question of counsel’s intent could still
be relevant), but the need to ever reach the third stage in the Batson inquiry would be inherently less likely.

109. See also Hon. J. Michele Childs, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, Panel Presentation for
the ABA Thirteenth Annual Labor and Employment Law Conference (Oct. 2019), in IS USING
IMPLICIT BIAS TO PROVE DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII AND OTHER ANTIDISCRIMINATION
STATUTES A VIABLE OPTION?: COMPILATION OF RELEVANT WRITTEN MATERIALS, Nov. 8, 2019,
at 12, 16, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2019/annual-conference/papers/compilation-of-written-materials.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KU3H-9Z7W]
(“Judges
should be careful in determining the outcome of Batson challenges. Judge Bennett [thus] concludes
that trial court judges only grant Batson challenges in ‘extreme situations.’ First, he contends that
trial judges are reluctant to reject the purportedly race-neutral reasons offered by the prosecution
or plaintiff. Second, he opines that appellate courts give deferential treatment to the decisions of
trial court judges.” (citing Bennett, supra note 20, at 166–68)).
110. 735 ILCS 5/2-1106.
111. 725 ILCS 5/115-4.
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CONCLUSION
Limiting the circumstances in which peremptory challenges may be
used in Illinois, to specifically allow only peremptory challenges that
meet the threshold endorsed by Justice Stevens, could resolve a number
of concerns and conflicts in Illinois law and could thus establish a threshold for peremptory challenges’ use, which would:
 Be consistent both with that endorsed by Justice Stevens in
Purkett v. Elem and that required by Batson v. Kentucky and
its progeny;
 Address the problem of implicit bias, as the courts have done
in Washington, and the likelihood that discrimination may play
a wrongful role in the exercise of peremptory challenges even
when it is unconscious, by disallowing any peremptory challenge which is not specifically based on a prospective juror’s
ability to perform their duties as a member of the jury;
 Further Illinois’s stated interest in addressing implicit biases in
ways that ensure that juries in this state are fairly drawn from
a fair cross section of the community;
 Reduce the need for trial courts to consider whether their ruling
on any given Batson challenge would trigger an ethics charge
against the attorneys before them, thus deescalating the possibility of unnecessary and inappropriate collateral injury stemming from such a decision;
 Avoid the prospect of disallowing peremptory challenges altogether, as Arizona has done, by limiting the use of such challenges to the specific circumstances for which the Supreme
Court has long found they are intended, namely cases in which
the propriety of a challenge for cause is unclear;
 Ensure that the parties and their counsel continue to have some
part to play and some decision-making authority with regard
to who is sworn in as a member of the jury that will decide
their case;
 Bring the law governing jury selection more in line with employment law by allowing a finding of discrimination when
there is evidence to show that the reason for excusing a prospective juror is unrelated to their ability to perform as a member of the jury;
 Reconcile the limits that are often imposed on what areas of
inquiry may be pursued in voir dire with the objectives of that
process; and
 Give the public confidence in the state court system and its
commitment to eradicating racism in jury selection.
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There is nothing in the applicable law that should inhibit the possibility
of such an approach, and, indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has at least
confirmed that Illinois has every right to establish a more restrictive structure for peremptory challenges than that required by Purkett, if it determines that is appropriate. Indeed, if there has been a case which basically
flips Purkett on its head in some ways, that case would have to be Rivera
v. Illinois.112
Rivera considered whether a peremptory challenge should have been
permitted as to a juror where counsel said he was concerned because she
“saw victims of violent crime on a daily basis” and that he was “pulled in
two different ways” because she had “some kind of Hispanic connection
given her name.”113 The trial court’s decision to disallow a peremptory
challenge in such circumstances thus stood in stark contrast to the concern with a juror’s haircut in Purkett, but the Supreme Court nevertheless
affirmed the disallowance of a peremptory in such circumstances:
[T]he loss of a peremptory challenge due to a state court’s good-faith
error is not a matter of federal constitutional concern. Rather, it is a
matter for the State to address under its own laws. . . . [T]his Court has
consistently held that there is no freestanding constitutional right to peremptory challenges. We have characterized peremptory challenges as
“a creature of statute,” and have made clear that a State may decline to
offer them at all.114

Illinois does not have to allow peremptory challenges for “silly or superstitious reasons” but could, instead, require that peremptory challenges be allowed only if they meet Justice Stevens’s threshold requirement that they “relate to the case to be tried.” For the reasons stated, that
is a direction this state should certainly consider.

112. Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 156 (2009).
113. Id. at 153.
114. Id. at 157 (internal citations omitted).

